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4.1 Introduction
The 1990s were amazing in many ways. Not only did the internet and cel-
lular phones come into widespread use, but overall economic conditions
improved nearly everywhere we look. Growth was higher, inﬂation was
lower, and both were more stable. In the United States, for example, inﬂa-
tion fell from 6 percent at the beginning of the decade to less than 2 percent
by the end. Meanwhile real growth rose from less than 3 percent to over 4
percent. Volatility declined, too. The American case is the most dramatic
instance of what has really been a worldwide trend.1 And while these im-
provements in economic performance could have been the consequence of
the world being calmer, Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2002) ar-
gue that roughly three-quarters of it can be explained by better monetary
policy. That is, central bankers did a better job of stabilizing inﬂation at low
levels while keeping growth high.
Making better monetary policy is not just a problem of ﬁnding compe-
tent central bankers. In fact, there is a history of central bankers who tried
to do their jobs but were thwarted by politicians. Over the years we have
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1. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) compare the 1985–89 period with 1993–97 for a set of
twenty-three industrialized and emerging-market countries and ﬁnd that annual inﬂation fell
by an average of 5 percentage points, annual growth rose by an average of 1 percentage point,
and both were signiﬁcantly more stable.learned that the institutional environment is at least as important as the
people in ensuring good policy outcomes. Without a well-designed central
bank, the people in charge don’t have a chance. Today, we have a good
sense of what best practice is in the design of central banks. First, it is cru-
cial that monetary policymakers are independent of short-term political
inﬂuences. Second, these independent central bankers must be held ac-
countable through mechanisms that involve public announcement of ob-
jectives. Inﬂation targeting is the most common formulation of the sort of
policy regime in place today.2 The primary element of inﬂation targeting is
a public commitment to price stability in the form of a medium-term nu-
merical inﬂation target.
With the success of inﬂation targeting has come a discussion of potential
reﬁnements. One issue is whether the central bank should adopt a target for
inﬂation or a target for the path of the price level. With an inﬂation target,
the central bank simply tries to ensure that period-by-period inﬂation re-
mains close to the target. When inﬂation turns out to be above or below the
target, the miss is forgotten. Bygones are bygones, so there is a form of base
drift in the (log) price level. Price-path targeting, or “price-level targeting”
as it is often called, is diﬀerent as it implies that when the price level is above
or below the target path, the objective of policy is to return it to the present
target path.3 This means that if prices move above the target path, then pol-
icy will need to bring them back down.4But which one is better? Should cen-
tral banks be instructed to target inﬂation or target the price path?
Svensson (1999) is the ﬁrst person to take on this question. He starts by
assuming that society cares about inﬂation. The social objective is to min-
imize the expected present discounted value of the weighted average of
squared deviations of inﬂation and output from their targets. He then
posits that the central bank can be bound to meet a particular objective but
not to respond to shocks in a speciﬁc way. That is, the central bank will al-
ways have discretion in adjusting its instrument, but it can be held ac-
countable for its objective. This sort of discretion, what we might refer to
as “instrument discretion,” implies that if we were to instruct central bank-
ers to minimize the true social loss function, there would be a bias. The
exact form of the bias depends on the structure of the economy, but in most
cases there is a bias toward stabilizing output.5 One solution to this prob-
lem is to instruct the central bank to minimize a loss function that deviates
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2. For a brief synopsis of what inﬂation targeting entails see Mishkin (forthcoming).
3. We adopt the terminology “price-path” targeting rather than the traditional “price-
level” targeting to emphasize that the target path can have a positive slope and so a period of
inﬂation need not be countered with one of deﬂation.
4. Mervyn King (1999) argues that in practice there is little diﬀerence between inﬂation tar-
geting and price-path targeting. The reason is that politicians will hold central bankers ac-
countable for meeting inﬂation targets over suﬃciently long horizons so that it will look like
a price-path target. We will take this up in more detail below.
5. For a discussion see Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999).from society’s. Rogoﬀ(1985) suggested appointing central bankers that are
more avid inﬂation hawks than the public at large.
In this context, Svensson shows that in countries where output is suﬃ-
ciently persistent, performance can be improved by instructing policy-
makers to target the price path, even though society cares about inﬂation.6
To understand why output persistence is central to the result, note that the
more persistent output is, the longer output stays away from equilibrium
following a disturbance. Now consider the possibility of a policy response.
Monetary policy responds to shocks by inducing a price-level surprise, im-
mediately creating a conﬂict between the output and inﬂation stability ob-
jectives. And the more persistent output is, the longer-lasting the shocks
and the more important it will be to respond aggressively to them. If the
goal is to stabilize prices, then these aggressive responses will have to be
undone quickly, which ends up lowering the volatility of inﬂation.
There are several issues that arise in considering this result. First, Svens-
son compares inﬂation targeting with price-path targeting in order to em-
phasize the contrast between the two. But there is really a continuum of in-
termediate possibilities that weight the two. Batini and Yates (2003) have
labeled these “hybrid-targeting” regimes. We begin by showing that for a
given degree of output persistence, there is an optimal hybrid-targeting
policy that is a weighted average of inﬂation and price-path targeting. 
But second, and more important, the focus on output persistence means
that the choice is an empirical one. What is the optimal regime for a given
country? Beyond this, there is the question of whether it is worth trying to
move to the optimal regime. Clarity is and should be prized in central
banking.
In fact, an optimal hybrid target sacriﬁces simplicity for optimality. It is
much more diﬃcult to explain a hybrid than it would be to explain either
of the extreme alternatives. However, as King (1999) has suggested, one of
the key policy choices is the horizon over which central bankers are evalu-
ated. That is, are they asked to maintain inﬂation at or near the target level
on average every two, three, ﬁve, or even ten years? Put another way, cen-
tral bankers will have a horizon over which they are expected to bring the
price level back to its desired path. Under this interpretation, hybrid tar-
geting becomes a statement about the optimal horizon over which the price
level is brought back to the desired path; it may not be that hard to con-
vince people that they should give the central bank some time to ﬁght back
unwanted price shocks.
Even so, the idea that central bankers should, for strategic reasons, be
told to do something that explicitly deviates from what society truly cares
about will trouble many people. Should we go to the effort of explaining
that we are instructing the central bank to do one thing, while we care
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6. More recent papers by Dittmar and Gavin (2000) and Vestin (2000) conﬁrm this result.about another, because we know that they can’t be trusted? Again, this isan
empirical question. How much do we lose by just telling monetary policy-
makers to target the thing that society cares about?
To address these issues, we examine a set of twenty-three countries and
ﬁnd that for nearly all of them some form of hybrid-targeting regime would
be optimal—at least in principle. But we go on to show that adopting such
an optimal regime has only very modest beneﬁts (as measured by the per-
centage reduction in the social loss) when compared with strict inﬂation
targeting. In other words, once you look at the numbers closely it is hard to
see the beneﬁt of starting to engage in what would surely be a very diﬃcult
public dialogue. Our conclusion is that we should hold central bankers ac-
countable for meeting our social loss function, not some contrived one that
might incrementally improve macroeconomic performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we set out the
theoretical problem and derive the optimal hybrid-targeting regime, and
we show that this can be interpreted as the optimal horizon. We also show
the relationship between output persistence and the weight on price stabil-
ity. We also present a set of empirical results and compare the loss between
an optimal-targeting regime and inﬂation or price-path targeting. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
4.2 Hybrid Targeting
The theoretical exercise is straightforward. Society cares about a
weighted average of inﬂation and output deviations from their target paths.
If it were possible to bind policymakers to react to shocks in a particular
way, then it would be optimal to give them society’s objective and then hold
them accountable for adjusting their policy instrument in the way pre-
scribed by the reaction function that minimizes this social objective. But
such commitment is impossible (and may not even be desirable). Instead,
the central bank can be held accountable for minimizing a loss function un-
der discretion. What should that loss function be?
To answer this question, we proceed in two steps. First, we derive the
central bank’s policy reaction function, or instrument rule, under discre-
tion for a family of loss functions that admits a wide variety of targeting
regimes. Second, given the solution we ﬁnd the targeting regime that min-
imizes the social loss. This is the optimal hybrid.
4.2.1 The Central Banker’s Problem
The policymaker solves a standard optimal control problem, choosing
the path of the price level that minimizes a quadratic loss function subject
to the constraints imposed by the linear structure of the economy. We as-
sume that the central bank minimizes
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t
 t[ (pt   pt ∗)2   (1    )(yt   yt ∗)2] ,
where LCB is the central bank’s loss, E is the expectation operator, pt is the
(log) actual price level, p∗is the desired price level, ytis the (log) actual out-
put, y∗ is desired (or potential) output level,   is the degree to which the
central bank prefers price stability to output stability, and   is the time
discount factor. Equation (1) is suﬃciently general to admit inﬂation tar-
geting, price-path targeting, and everything in between. Targeting regimes
diﬀer depending on how the target, pt ∗, is deﬁned. The simplest cases are
inﬂation targeting, where
(2) pt ∗(IT)   pt 1    ∗,
and price-path targeting, where
(3) pt ∗(PPT)   p∗
t 1    ∗.
In both cases the inﬂation target is  ∗. But under inﬂation targeting, given
by equation (2), the target is an increment over the past period’s realized
price level, whatever it turned out to be. By contrast, under price-path tar-
geting, the current target is an increment over the past period’s target.
Hybrid targeting is a weighted average of inﬂation and price-path tar-
geting. That is,
(4) pt ∗(Hybrid)    (pt 1    ∗)   (1    )(p∗
t 1    ∗)
  pt 1   (1    )p∗
t 1    ∗,
where   is the weight on inﬂation targeting. Notice that   1 and   0
are the special cases, inﬂation and price-path targeting, respectively. Sub-
stituting equation (4) into the loss function (1), and normalizing various
constants and initial conditions to zero, we get
(5) LCB   E ∑
t
 [ (pt   pt 1)2   (1    )yt
2] .
Normalization implies that y is now the output gap and that the price path
is now measured as the deviation from the inﬂation objective  ∗.
Following Svensson (1999) and others, we assume that the dynamics of
the economy are adequately described by a neoclassical Phillips Curve.7
That is,
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7. We choose the neoclassical Phillips curve because of its theoretical tractability. There are
a number of alternatives, including the now common New Keynesian Phillips curve in which
the output gap depends on expected future prices rather than current ones, and the aggregate
supply formulation derived by Mankiw and Reis (2001) in their work on sticky information.
While it would be feasible to examine these alternatives numerically, the more conventional
Phillips curve allows us to derive a wider range of conclusions.(6) yt    yt 1    (pt   pt
e)   εt,
where pt
e is the expectation of p at time t,   and   are constants, and ε is an
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock with variance  ε
2.
For the points that we wish to make here, this closed-economy model is
suﬃcient. In the empirical section, we expand the analysis to an open-
economy version that includes import prices as well.
The job of the central bank is to choose a path for the price level pt that
minimizes the loss (5) subject to equation (6).8 Assuming rational expecta-
tions, we can use the techniques described in Svensson (1999) to ﬁrst derive
the ﬁrst-order conditions, guess the solution, and then use the method of
undetermined coeﬃcients.9 The ﬁrst-order conditions include the output
equation (6) and 
(7) pt   pt 1    yt.
Equation (7) embodies the trade-oﬀ between output and prices in the loss
function. It tells us the extent to which prices react to output shocks along
an optimal path. Under rational expectations, we know that the solution
for the price level must be of the form
(8) pt   apt 1   byt 1   cεt.
We can solve this for
a  
b 





where D   












Setting   equal to either zero or 1, this solution collapses to the one in
Svensson (1999).
This formulation allows us to write the laws of motion for output and
prices, and these are
(9) yt    yt 1   (1    c)εt




   
     
2   
 (1    )(1   a  )
   
 [1      (  b )](1      )
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8. By adding an aggregate-demand curve relating the price level to the interest rate, we
could shift the problem to one in which the central bank does not choose prices directly. This
increase in complexity changes none of our results.
9. See also Söderlind (1999).(10) pt   pt 1   byt 1   cεt.
That is, output depends on lagged output, while prices depend on both
lagged prices and lagged output.
As others have noted, for a solution to the central banker’s problem to
exist, the coeﬃcient on lagged output in the price equation, b, must have a
















Parkin (2000) points out that this condition is somewhat restrictive, since
only large values of  are consistent with high persistence in output ( close
to one). This means that if   is low and   is high, there is no solution. The
reason is that under these circumstances the optimal response to stabilize
output requires very high, even inﬁnite, volatility of the price level (or in-
ﬂation).10 Fortunately, most estimates that we know of suggest that central
banks place much higher weight on inﬂation than they do on output
volatility. For example, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) estimate  ’s for a
number of countries, and most of them are 3/4 or higher. So we view this
problem as unlikely to occur in practice.
4.2.2 Society’s Problem
With a complete characterization of the central bank’s problem in hand,
we can now turn to society’s problem: what value of   should monetary
policymakers be instructed to use? To ﬁgure this out, all we need to do is
ﬁnd the value of   that minimizes the social loss function, taking account
of the central banker’s behavior. Recall that we assume society minimizes
a weighted average of inﬂation and output variability. We can write this as
(12) LS      2
    (1    ) 2
y.
For now we look only at the case in which   is the same for society and the
central bank. Using the previous results, we can write this as










    (1    )   
1  
1






Taking the derivative with respect to   (noting that D is not a function of
  and assuming that the condition [11] holds) yields the optimal hybrid-
targeting regime:
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10. As we show in the appendix, this is a problem that only arises under discretion. If the
central bank can be forced to commit to an instrument rule, then the problem always has a
solution.The result tells us that as   approaches 1, so that the shocks to output are
extremely persistent,  ∗ goes to zero. As   shrinks,  ∗ grows, but we as-
sume that it can never exceed 1. Importantly, the expression is consistent
with Svensson’s result. He shows that if one is restricted to choosing   0
or   1, then the threshold is at   0.5.
Before proceeding, we note that under commitment, where society can
bind policymakers not just to an objective function but to an instrument
rule as well, the best thing to do is to give the central bank society’s loss
function. That is not at all surprising. What is surprising is that if society’s
loss is in terms of the price path rather than inﬂation—that is, LS is a func-
tion of  2
prather than  2
 —then the discretionary solution is the same as the
commitment solution.11
4.2.3 Stabilization Bias
So far, we have been concerned with the beneﬁts to be obtained from
giving the central bank a hybrid target. But in addition to choosing  ∗, so-
ciety has the option of giving the central bank a   that deviates from its
own. The incentive for doing this comes from the fact that, left to their
own devices, central bankers may choose to stabilize output more than is
socially optimal. Avoiding this stabilization bias requires setting  CB
above  S.
To see how this works, we return to equation (13) and note ﬁrst that  
here represents social preferences and that D (deﬁned in the previous sec-
tion) is a function of the central bank’s  . Using this, we can rewrite the ex-
pression for the social loss as












    (1    s) 
   
1 
1
 2    






This change has no impact on the degree of optimal hybrid targeting.  ∗
was not a function of   before, and it is not now. But minimizing equation
(15) requires not only ﬁnding  ∗ but also ﬁguring out what  CB should be














where f( ) is an increasing function of  . So with given  s, as  rises,  CBrises
as well.
Figure 4.1 plots the relationship between output persistence and  CB
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11. If inﬂation’s primary cost is that it makes long-term planning diﬃcult, then this may be
the case we should all be focusing on. See the appendix for details.when  s is 0.5 and 0.8. Throughout we assume that   is set at the optimal
level,  ∗ in equation (14). The result is clear: the more persistent output is,
the more conservative the central bank should be. And as the output ap-
proaches a random walk, the closer  CB gets to 1.
This is a good place to make another important point. In the last section
we noted that there are times when the discretionary solution to the central
banker’s problem does not exist. Looking back at the restriction (11) re-
quired for existence, we see that there is always a solution when   is big
enough. So, if we are concerned that   may be high, we can avoid potential
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A
B
Fig. 4.1 Central bank’s  : A, Central bank’s lambda when society’s lambda   0.5;
B, Central bank’s lambda when society’s lambda   0.8diﬃculties by instructing the central banker to care almost exclusively
about inﬂation.
4.3 Empirical Results
We now see that the optimal hybrid-targeting regime—the degree to
which the central bank should target inﬂation relative to targeting the path
of the price level—depends on how persistent output is. This leads us to
ask the following questions: how persistent is output, and how close is the
actual behavior of prices to what it would be under an optimal-targeting
regime? The task of this section is to bring data to bear on these questions.
We do this in three steps. First, we estimate an empirical analog of the
closed-economy model we studied in section 4.2. Second, since a number
of countries we consider are small open economies, we introduce external
factors into the estimation. Finally, we posit a social loss function in order
to do welfare comparisons and measure the gains from adopting an opti-
mal hybrid target.
4.3.1 Closed Economy
Our strategy is the following. Using quarterly data on consumer prices
and industrial production, we estimate equations (9) and (10).12 (The data
are all described in the appendix.) Taking account of the serial correlation
in output, we use the following speciﬁcations:
(16) yt    yt 1  ∑
4
i 1
 i yt i   e1t
(17) pt   pt 1   b1yt 1   b2yt 2   b3yt 3   b4yt 4   e2t,
where y is computed as the deviation of log output from Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) ﬁltered output, and p measures the deviation of the log price level
from a measure of the target. During the periods when countries were em-
ploying inﬂation targets, we used the target itself for this computation.13In
the absence of an inﬂation target, we used a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
The results for both the full sample (1980s and 1990s) and just the last
decade are reported in tables 4.1and 4.2.Estimates range widely.14The ﬁrst
table shows estimates of  , together with standard errors. The important
thing to notice is that   ranges from a low of 0.29 to a high of 0.82 and that
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12. We note that our exact results are not invariant to the choice of the frequency of the
data.
13. For the cases in which we have data for an explicit inﬂation target, we compute the price-
path target as pt ∗ log(CPIt–1)   ∗, where  ∗is the annual inﬂation target. Details are in the
appendix.
14. All estimates throughout the paper are median-bias corrected using the empirical dis-
tributions that are also used to compute the standard errors.it is unstable across time periods. Both the range and instability have im-
portant implications for policy, so we will return to them later.15
Table 4.2 reports our estimates of the optimal hybrid-targeting regime,
  ˆ∗, as well as the estimate that is implied by the actual behavior of prices in
each country,   ˜. Our estimates of   suggest that a number of countries
should be putting signiﬁcant weight on the price path,   ˆ∗     1, but virtu-
ally all of them exhibit behavior that is closer to inﬂation targeting,   ˜ ≈ 1.
Given these estimates, we test whether   ˜    ∗, and the answer is no. The
p-value is reported in columns (3) and (6) of table 4.2.16
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Table 4.1 Output persistence: The closed-economy case
Full sample 1990s
Country   ˆ Standard error   ˆ Standard error
Australia 0.64 0.10 0.49 0.18
Austria 0.76 0.19 0.66 0.36
Canada 0.73 0.06 0.74 0.09
Chile 0.57 0.21 0.47 0.43
Denmark 0.56 0.14 0.31 0.23
Finland 0.78 0.07 0.65 0.13
France 0.61 0.15 0.61 0.15
Germany 0.70 0.10 0.61 0.17
Ireland 0.56 0.12 0.50 0.19
Israel 0.56 0.09 0.29 0.15
Italy 0.71 0.10 0.63 0.15
Japan 0.78 0.05 0.69 0.09
Korea 0.58 0.10 0.60 0.13
Mexico 0.64 0.10 0.69 0.15
The Netherlands 0.64 0.15 0.68 0.23
New Zealand 0.58 0.10 0.58 0.15
Norway 0.43 0.16 0.55 0.19
Portugal 0.76 0.08 0.69 0.14
Spain 0.72 0.07 0.70 0.11
Sweden 0.71 0.09 0.60 0.13
Switzerland 0.33 0.22 0.35 0.33
United Kingdom 0.80 0.07 0.78 0.08
United States 0.76 0.04 0.82 0.06
Notes: Estimates   ˆ are small sample bias-corrected autocorrelation coeﬃcients from fourth-
order autoregression using industrial production, equation (16). All data are quarterly data,
seasonally adjusted and ﬁltered using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The full sample is 1980 Q1 to
2001 Q4 for non-euro-area countries. For countries in EMU, the sample ends in 1998 Q4.
Standard errors are constructed from nonparametric bootstrap with 3,000 replications.
15. While we report results for a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with parameter set to the
standard 1600, experimentation in the range from 800 to 3200 leaves the character of our re-
sults unchanged.
16. Using a nonparametric bootstrap, we compute the empirical distribution of   ˆ∗and then
report the p-value for   ˜ in that distribution.4.3.2 Open Economy
To take account of the fact that countries like Israel, Belgium, and Ire-
land are small and open, we introduce external factors into our analysis.
Following Svensson (2000), we introduce import prices into the Phillips
curve (6):
(18) yt    yt 1    (pt   pt
e)    ypt
F   εt,
where pt
F is the foreign price level denominated in domestic currency. With
this modiﬁcation, all of the results in section 4.2 go through, and we can
rewrite empirical speciﬁcation equations (9) and (10) as
(19) yt    yt 1  ∑
4
i 1
 i yt i    ypt
F   e1t
(20) pt   pt 1   b1yt 1   b2yt 2   b3yt 3   b4yt 4    ppt
F   e2t.
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Table 4.2 The optimal hybrid-targeting regime: The closed-economy case
Full sample 1990s
p-value testing p-value testing
Country   ˆ∗   ˜   ˜    ∗   ˆ∗   ˜   ˜    ∗
Australia 0.29 0.81 0.01 0.50 0.69 0.33
Austria 0.15 0.68 0.07 0.25 0.46 0.26
Canada 0.18 0.94 0.00 0.18 0.88 0.00
Chile 0.36 0.72 0.22 0.31 0.64 0.31
Denmark 0.39 0.67 0.17 1.00 0.24 0.14
Finland 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.26 0.84 0.03
France 0.31 0.80 0.08 0.32 0.80 0.08
Germany 0.21 0.83 0.00 0.32 0.67 0.15
Ireland 0.39 0.81 0.09 0.49 0.63 0.37
Israel 0.39 0.90 0.03 1.00 0.79 0.26
Italy 0.21 0.94 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.05
Japan 0.14 0.75 0.00 0.23 0.70 0.01
Korea 0.35 0.90 0.02 0.34 0.56 0.19
Mexico 0.28 0.86 0.01 0.23 0.83 0.05
The Netherlands 0.28 0.88 0.06 0.24 0.60 0.17
New Zealand 0.36 0.93 0.03 0.36 0.54 0.25
Norway 0.64 0.77 0.39 0.38 0.56 0.32
Portugal 0.16 0.88 0.00 0.23 0.83 0.04
Spain 0.19 0.80 0.00 0.22 0.92 0.01
Sweden 0.21 0.84 0.00 0.33 0.53 0.21
Switzerland 1.00 0.89 0.44 0.89 0.87 0.36
United Kingdom 0.12 0.76 0.00 0.14 0.44 0.01
United States 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.91 0.00
Source: Data sources are all described in the appendix. 
Notes: Estimates of   ˆ∗ are constructed using the   ˆ in table 4.1. Estimates of   ˜a re the coeﬃ-
cient on the lag of prices from equation (17). The p-values for the tests are constructed using
a nonparametric bootstrap with 3,000 replications.Table 4.3 reports estimates of output persistence,  , after accounting for
these external factors. The results are very similar to those in table 4.1. The
correlation between these two sets of estimates is 0.96 for the full sample
and 0.89 for the 1990s, and the mean absolute diﬀerence between the esti-
mates is 0.03 and 0.075, respectively. Looking at the estimates of the vari-
ous measures of   in table 4.4, our conclusions from the closed-economy
analysis remain. In virtually every case, our estimate of the optimal hybrid
target has   well below 1, closer to price-path targeting than inﬂation tar-
geting, but the actual behavior of prices in these countries suggests some-
thing close to inﬂation targeting.
It is interesting to relate all of these results to what King (1999) referred
to as an evaluation horizon for central bankers. He suggested that in prac-
tice an inﬂation-targeting central bank will be evaluated on whether it met
its target on average over some number of years. The evaluation horizon is
related to the hybrid regime. The longer the period over which inﬂation is
averaged, the closer the regime is to price-path targeting. Using this intu-
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Table 4.3 Output persistence: The open-economy case
Full sample 1990s
Country   ˆ Standard error   ˆ Standard error
Australia 0.66 (0.09) 0.58 (0.19)
Austria 0.84 (0.23) 0.63 (0.50)
Canada 0.75 (0.06) 0.73 (0.11)
Chile 0.61 (0.07) n.a. n.a.
Denmark 0.61 (0.15) 0.13 (0.31)
Finland 0.79 (0.05) 0.78 (0.14)
France n.a. n.a. 0.61 (0.17)
Germany 0.73 (0.11) 0.69 (0.20)
Ireland 0.48 (0.14) 0.60 (0.22)
Israel 0.56 (0.09) 0.15 (0.17)
Italy 0.73 (0.09) 0.63 (0.13)
Japan 0.73 (0.04) 0.59 (0.09)
Korea 0.67 (0.11) 0.60 (0.12)
Mexico 0.67 (0.11) 0.53 (0.21)
The Netherlands 0.65 (0.17) 0.59 (0.29)
New Zealand 0.59 (0.10) 0.64 (0.16)
Norway 0.46 (0.16) 0.67 (0.21)
Portugal 0.78 (0.08) 0.75 (0.18)
Spain 0.73 (0.05) 0.74 (0.09)
Sweden 0.74 (0.10) 0.65 (0.16)
Switzerland 0.32 (0.24) 0.18 (0.43)
United Kingdom 0.81 (0.07) 0.79 (0.04)
United States 0.78 (0.03) 0.84 (0.04)
Source: See appendix and notes to table 4.1 for data sources.
Note: n.a.   not available.ition, we can construct approximate measures of the horizon as (1/ ). For
many countries we ﬁnd that  ∗ is between 0.2 and 0.3, implying a horizon
of between three and four quarters. To get a number that is usable in prac-
tice, we need to add another four to six quarters, the length of time that it
takes for policy changes to have an impact on prices and output. The im-
plication is that the evaluation horizon should be in the range of two to
three years.
Before continuing, note that we recomputed all of the results for both the
closed- and open-economy versions of our model substituting core con-
sumer prices for the headline measures used in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
Tables analogous to 4.2 and 4.4 are in the appendix. Overall, we ﬁnd that
the change in the price measure makes very little diﬀerence. Estimates of
  ˜f r om the price equation are highly correlated between the two sets of
matching results. For the full sample, the correlation for the seventeen
countries for which we have data is 0.79 for the closed-economy model and
0.83 when import prices are included.
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Table 4.4 Optimal hybrid-targeting regime: The open-economy case
Full sample 1990s
p-value testing p-value testing
Country   ˆ∗   ˜   ˜    ∗   ˆ∗   ˜   ˜    ∗
Australia 0.26 0.82 0.01 0.37 0.70 0.20
Austria 0.09 0.52 0.09 0.29 0.38 0.32
Canada 0.17 0.95 0.00 0.19 0.90 0.00
Chile 0.20 0.57 0.17 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 0.31 0.52 0.20 1.00 0.30 0.37
Finland 0.13 0.89 0.00 0.14 0.83 0.01
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.33 0.67 0.17
Germany 0.19 0.72 0.01 0.21 0.75 0.09
Ireland 0.53 0.78 0.27 0.32 0.71 0.20
Israel 0.39 0.90 0.02 1.00 0.80 0.23
Italy 0.19 0.83 0.01 0.25 0.90 0.07
Japan 0.18 0.71 0.00 0.35 0.70 0.06
Korea 0.26 0.86 0.02 0.29 0.48 0.26
Mexico 0.26 0.88 0.01 0.42 0.88 0.20
The Netherlands 0.26 0.83 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.27
New Zealand 0.34 0.99 0.01 0.28 0.50 0.19
Norway 0.56 0.77 0.32 0.24 0.62 0.16
Portugal 0.14 0.85 0.00 0.16 0.85 0.04
Spain 0.18 0.78 0.00 0.17 0.90 0.01
Sweden 0.19 0.80 0.00 0.26 0.53 0.16
Switzerland 1.00 0.86 0.48 1.00 0.87 0.34
United Kingdom 0.11 0.76 0.00 0.13 0.44 0.00
United States 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.10 0.63 0.00
Source: See appendix and notes to text table 4.2. 
Note: n.a.   not available.4.3.3 Loss Comparison
Simply computing the optimal value for  , the degree of a hybrid regime,
is only the ﬁrst step. What we really want to know is whether adopting the
optimal hybrid makes any diﬀerence to welfare. Given the fact that esti-
mates of   are fairly imprecise, this question is particularly important. To
address it, we construct estimates of the social loss, LS, for diﬀerent tar-
geting regimes and compare them. Computing the loss requires that we
choose a series of parameters. Before turning to the data, it is useful to look
at some simulations. Using the theoretical results, we can estimate the ex-
tent of the welfare gain that comes from going from an inﬂation-targeting
regime to an optimal one. That is, we compare LS(  1) with LS(    ∗)
for various values of the parameters of the model. Note that throughout
this exercise we assume that the preference parameter   is the same for so-
ciety and the central bank.
While it would be interesting to look across a wide range of values for the
preference parameter  , output persistence  , and the slope coeﬃcient  ,
the condition (11) places restrictions on the relationship among these. So
instead we look at a representative example. First, the restriction has a few
simple properties: (a) given  , the higher   the higher the minimum  ; and
(b) given  , the higher  the higher the minimum  . What that means is that
the more persistent output and the ﬂatter the aggregate supply curve—that
is, the inverse of   in equation (6)—the higher the preference for inﬂation
stability has to be for there to be a solution to the central bank’s problem.
To understand how restrictive this is, we have done a few simple calcula-
tions. Setting the discount factor   0.99, we see that for   0.5 and   
0.7,   must be greater than 0.65. As   decreases, the range of permissible
values grows. So when   0.3,   can be as low as 0.4 for   0.7. This cre-
ates a potential problem for the choice of  . While we would like to work
with relatively low values, we choose   0.5. This is the choice made by
Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland (1999), who use estimates in Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) as justiﬁcation.
Using these parameter values, we examine the improvement in the social
loss for each country for two changes: (a) moving from strict inﬂation tar-
geting to the optimal hybrid regimes, that is, LS( ∗)/LS(  1); and (b)
shifting from a strict price-path targeting regime to the optimal hybrid,
LS( ∗)/LS(  0). Throughout we assume that the preference parameter  
 0.8 and the discount rate   0.99. The results are somewhat sensitive to
the choice of   but not to the choice of  . Looking at table 4.5, we see that
there is an important pattern. In no case does a move from price-path tar-
geting to the optimal hybrid bring a sizable welfare gain. The same is not
true of a move from inﬂation targeting. That is, the ﬁrst and third columns
include numbers that are far below 1—for example, 0.82 for Canada and
0.87 for Germany—while the second and fourth columns contain none.
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ratios LS( ∗)/LS(  0) and LS( ∗)/LS(  1) for a range of values for  
and  , assuming   0.5 and   0.99. Taken together, these give us a
striking picture of the potential beneﬁts from adopting various regimes.
First, note from panel A that even if   is very small, and so the optimal
regime is close to one of pure inﬂation targeting, the loss from adopting
price-path targeting is small. Only when   is set to 2/3, a relatively low
value, and when output has virtually no persistence does a move from
price-path targeting to the optimal hybrid imply a welfare gain of as much
as 10 percent.
This is in stark contrast to panel B of ﬁgure 4.2, where we see the conse-
quences of shifting from a pure inﬂation-targeting regime to the optimal
hybrid. As output persistence rises above 0.6, the ratio of the losses starts
to decrease very quickly. (Note that the lines end at the point where re-
striction [11] is no longer met.) That is, the gain from moving from inﬂa-
tion targeting to the optimal hybrid can be very large. To use Svensson’s
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Table 4.5 Loss comparison
Full sample 1990s
Country LS( ∗)/LS(  = 1) LS( ∗)/LS(  = 0) LS( ∗)/LS(  = 1) LS( ∗)/LS(  = 0)
Australia 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.99
Austria 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.95 1.00
Canada 0.82 1.00 0.86 1.00
Chile 0.91 0.99 0.71∗ 0.71∗
Denmark 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.96
Finland 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.72 1.00
France 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.99
Germany 0.87 1.00 0.91 0.99
Ireland 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99
Israel 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.96
Italy 0.87 1.00 0.94 0.99
Japan 0.85 1.00 0.97 0.99
Korea 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.99
Mexico 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.99
The Netherlands 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.99
New Zealand 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.99
Norway 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.99
Portugal 0.71 1.00 0.80 1.00
Spain 0.86 1.00 0.84 1.00
Sweden 0.86 1.00 0.94 0.99
Switzerland 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.98
United Kingdom 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.71∗
United States 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.71∗
Notes: Computations use   0.5 and   0.8, as well as the estimated value of   reported in table 4.1.
Asterisks indicate values of ( ,  ,  ) for which restriction (11) is not met, and so the loss cannot be com-
puted. The reported value is the minimum for which it can be computed.A
B
Fig. 4.2 Loss comparing targeting regimes with optimal targeting: A, Comparing
price-path targeting to the optimal hybrid regime (  0.5); B, Comparing inﬂation
targeting to the optimal hybrid regime (  0.5)terminology, there is a “free lunch,” and it can be big. And since we are un-
sure how big   really is, it is likely prudent to move to price-path targeting.
4.4 Conclusion
We have examined whether a country is well advised to target inﬂation,
target the price path, or do something in between. The issue turns on the
persistence of output deviations from their trend. With high persistence,
which is what we tend to observe, our theoretical results suggest that coun-
tries are best oﬀ if they adopt a hybrid target that is close to price-path tar-
geting. But such a policy regime would be diﬃcult to adopt for two reasons.
First, there is the technical one. The exact targeting procedure depends
on the estimation of both the output trend and output persistence, both of
which are going to be measured with substantial error. Second, the success
or failure of any monetary policy regime rests critically on the ability of
central bankers to communicate what they are doing to the public. Ex-
plaining a hybrid target would be challenging for even the best central
bankers.
Taking these problems into account, we examine the welfare loss from
adopting pure inﬂation or price-path targeting rather than the optimal hy-
brid. Our conclusion is that price-path targeting is less risky, in that the
maximum social loss from being wrong—choosing price-path targeting




All data are quarterly beginning in quarter 1 (Q1) of 1980. For European
Monetary Union (EMU) countries, data are through 1998 Q4. For non-
EMU countries, data are through 2001 Q4.
1. Prices: Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics.
2. Output: Industrial Production from the IMF International Financial
Statistics (IFS), except for Portugal and Ireland, which are entirely from
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);
New Zealand is from the OECD for 2000 Q3 on; Italy is from OECD for
2001 Q1 on; and Chile is manufacturing production only.
3. Core consumer prices: From the OECD.
4. Import prices: The import price index from the IMF International
Financial Statistics, except for Spain, New Zealand, the Netherlands,
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy (where the unit value of imports
190 Stephen G. Cecchetti and Junhan Kimfrom IFS is used), Mexico (Import Price Index from Haver Analytics),
Austria (which uses the German CPI), and Portugal (an equally weighted
average of the CPIs for the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Ger-
many).
5. Inﬂation targets are computed from the Inﬂation Targeting Country
Fact Sheets” by Frank Gaenssmantel of the Institute of International Eco-
nomics, courtesy of Edwin Truman.
The inﬂation targets are listed in table 4A.1. The target pt ∗ is computed
as follows:
(A1) pt ∗   pt 1    ∗
(A2) pt   log(CPIt)   pt ∗ when there is pt ∗
(A3) pt   log(CPIt)   HPtrendt otherwise,
where  ∗is the annual inﬂation target in table 4A.1, divided by four. When
the target is a range, the midpoint is used.
The Commitment Case
Our solutions in the text assume that the central bank operates under
discretion. Discretion means that policymakers reoptimize the loss func-
tion every period after observing the state variable yt–1and the shock εt. The
alternative to this is commitment, in which the central bank optimizes once
and commits to an instrument rule once and for all.
To ﬁnd the commitment solution we take the derivative of the central
bank’s loss in equation (5) with respect to ptand pt
e, subject to the constraint
imposed by the Phillips curve in equation (6). The resulting policy rule, the
equivalent to equation (8), is
(A4) pt   pt 1   c ˜εt,
where
c ˜    
1  
D ˜













This is exactly the same as the case under discretion considered in section
4.2.1, except that b   0. That is, under commitment the optimal response
is to react only to the past price level and the shock, not to yt–1. Recall,
moreover, that the condition for a solution to exist under discretion,
shown in equation (11), arises in computing b, and so it is not present
here.
Continuing with the problem under commitment, society’s loss, the
equivalent to equation (13), is now
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Table 4A.1 Annual inﬂation target
Country Period Inﬂation target (%)
Australia 1993 Q1–2001 Q4 2.5
Austria 1993 Q1–2001 Q4 2.0
Canada 1992 Q1–1994 Q4 4.0
1995 Q1–2001 Q4 3.0
Chile 1991 Q1–1991 Q4 18.0
1992 Q1–1992 Q4 17.5
1993 Q1–1993 Q4 11.0
1994 Q1–1994 Q4 10.0
1995 Q1–1995 Q4 8.0
1996 Q1–1996 Q4 7.0
1997 Q1–1997 Q4 6.0
1998 Q1–1998 Q4 5.0
1999 Q1–1999 Q4 4.3
2000 Q1–2000 Q4 3.5
2001 Q1–2001 Q4 3.0
Finland 1993 Q1–2001 Q4 2.0
Israel 1992 Q1–1992 Q4 14.5
1993 Q1–1993 Q4 10.0
1994 Q1–1994 Q4 8.0
1995 Q1–1995 Q4 9.5
1996 Q1–1996 Q4 9.0
1997 Q1–1997 Q4 8.5
1998 Q1–1999 Q4 4.0
2000 Q1–2000 Q4 3.5
2001 Q1–2001 Q4 3.0
Korea 1999 Q1–1999 Q4 3.75
2000 Q1–2000 Q4 2.5
2001 Q1–2001 Q4 3.0
Mexico 1995 Q1–1995 Q4 19.0
1996 Q1–1996 Q4 20.5
1997 Q1–1997 Q4 15.0
1998 Q1–1998 Q4 12.0
1999 Q1–1999 Q4 13.0
2000 Q1–2000 Q4 10.0
2001 Q1–2001 Q4 6.5
New Zealand 1992 Q1–1996 Q4 1.0
1997 Q1–2001 Q4 1.5
Norway 2001 Q1–2001 Q4 2.5
United Kingdom 1992 Q1–2001 Q4 2.5
Source: Gaenssmantel (2002).
The   that minimizes this loss is trivially 1, which implies inﬂation target-
ing. Under commitment, it is optimal to simply give the central bank soci-
ety’s loss function.
When Society Prefers Price-Path Targeting
What if society’s preferences are in terms of the path of the price level
rather than an inﬂation target? In this case, the central bank’s problem isInﬂation Targeting, Price-Path Targeting, and Output Variability 193
the same as the one in section 4.2.1. It is the social loss, equation (12), that
changes. Assuming society cares about the price path implies that the so-
cial loss function is
(A6) LS      2
p   (1    ) 2
y.
Substituting in the solution for the central bank’s problem, this becomes
(A7) LS    D2  
1  
1









     (1    )  2
y.
Equation (A7) is the equivalent to text equation (13). The optimal   that
minimizes this loss is zero. So, if society cares about the price path, then the
central bank should be told to care about it, too.
Substituting Core for Headline Consumer Prices
The following tables are from substituting measures of the core CPI for
the headline CPI in the computations of section 4.3. Table 4A.2 is the ana-
log to text table 4.2, and table 4A.3is the analog to text table 4.4. Note that
Table 4A.2 Optimal hybrid-targeting regime: Closed economy with core CPI
Full sample 1990s
p-value testing p-value testing
Country   ˆ∗   ˜   ˜    ∗   ˆ∗   ˜   ˜    ∗
Australia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.50 0.70 0.32
Austria 0.15 0.44 0.14 0.25 0.27 0.41
Canada 0.18 0.93 0.00 0.18 0.87 0.00
Chile n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 0.39 0.56 0.25 1.00 0.21 0.12
Finland 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.26 0.73 0.05
France 0.31 0.92 0.06 0.32 0.92 0.06
Germany 0.21 0.90 0.00 0.32 0.81 0.11
Ireland 0.39 0.81 0.08 0.49 0.67 0.33
Israel n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 0.21 0.94 0.00 0.29 1.03 0.04
Japan 0.14 0.39 0.00 0.23 0.47 0.04
Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.34 0.63 0.16
Mexico 0.28 0.91 0.01 0.23 0.84 0.05
The Netherlands 0.28 0.79 0.07 0.24 0.52 0.20
New Zealand 0.36 0.81 0.03 0.36 0.54 0.26
Norway n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.38 0.63 0.28
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.23 0.79 0.04
Spain 0.19 0.79 0.00 0.22 0.83 0.01
Sweden 0.21 0.78 0.00 0.33 0.46 0.27
Switzerland 1.00 1.02 0.39 1.00 0.93 0.34
United Kingdom 0.12 0.70 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.02
United States 0.16 0.97 0.00 0.11 0.68 0.00
Source: See appendix and notes to text table 4.2.
Note: n.a.   not available.since the output equations (16) and (19) do not include the price level, the
estimates of  and  ∗are unchanged, and so the corresponding columns in
the tables are identical. Comparing these results to those in the text, we
conclude that substituting core for headline prices changes little.
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Comment N. Gregory Mankiw
I like the starting point of this paper—the question of whether inﬂation
targeting or price-level targeting is the better policy for a central bank to
adopt. Like the authors, I think this is an important and still open question
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Bureau of Economic Research.in the analysis of monetary policy. And I agree with the paper’s conclusion
that, given our current understanding of the issue, price-level targeting is
probably the better of the two alternatives. (For my approach to this issue,
see Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003.)
The job of discussant, however, is like that of Mark Antony—not to
praise the authors but to bury them. So even though there is a lot in this pa-
per that I agree with, in my comments I will emphasize the points of dis-
agreement. Going from the starting point (which I like) to the conclusion
(with which I concur), this paper takes a few wrong turns along the way.
Sometimes these wrong turns follow in the footsteps of the literature; other
times the authors strike out in a mistaken direction all on their own.
Fortunately, one wrong turn the authors avoided is the use of an im-
plausible model of inﬂation-output dynamics, although they make the mis-
take of apologizing for this fact. In a footnote, they say that they use a neo-
classical Phillips curve for its tractability, suggesting that they would have
preferred to use a New Keynesian Phillips curve. In my view, this gets
things exactly backward. I think that every paper in this conference that
uses the New Keynesian Phillips curve should apologize. Let me suggest
the following footnote for those papers: “We use the New Keynesian
Phillips curve even though its predictions about monetary policy are in-
consistent with what most empirical studies ﬁnd and with what every cen-
tral banker knows to be true. We use this model because we think it is neat,
and because that’s what everybody else is doing.”
Another way in which the authors’ views diﬀer from mine is in their ac-
ceptance of the Svenssonian approach to the analysis of monetary policy.
As I understand it, the Svenssonian approach is based on the idea that two
wrongs make a right, as least if the wrongs are well chosen. That is, society
has a problem because monetary policy is made by discretion and thus su-
ﬀers from time inconsistency. We can ﬁx this problem, however, by assign-
ing the central bank an objective function that diﬀers from the true social
welfare function. The Svensson insight is that the wrong of having an in-
correct objective function can oﬀset the wrong of having discretionary pol-
icy. This is a classic second-best type of analysis.
What puzzles me about this approach is the question of implementation.
That is, how are we supposed to give the central bank this new objective
function?
One possibility is that the central bank takes direction from a higher au-
thority, such as Congress. In this case, why would the higher authority di-
rect the central bank to have the wrong objective function? It seems more
natural to direct the central bank to follow the optimal rule based on the
true social welfare function. This is roughly McCallum’s “just do it” view-
point, and it is similar to the approach envisioned by Woodford’s “time-
less” perspective on monetary policy analysis. It is not at all obvious to me
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feasible than the other. That is, if the higher authority can assign an objec-
tive function to the central bank, it should be able to assign the central
bank the constraint of being time consistent.
There is, however, another way to think about implementing the Svens-
sonian objective function. When we appoint central bankers, we can look
around the population of candidates and pick someone who happened
tothink that the true social welfare function was the one that Svensson de-
rives as the right one for a central bank to maximize. This central banker
would be wrong, but he would be wrong in a useful way. This is akin to Ro-
goﬀ’s analysis of why we might want central bankers to be more conserva-
tive, in the sense of more inﬂation averse, than the general public.
This approach to implementation also strikes me as a bit odd. If a po-
tential central banker is misguided about the social welfare function, why
would that be the case? Most likely, he has the wrong model of the econ-
omy. The Svensson-Rogoﬀ assumption is that the central banker has the
right model but the wrong social welfare function. My experience is that
people who are confused about one thing are often confused about other
things as well. Looking for public servants who are confused in just the
right way to oﬀset the problems of discretionary policy does not seem like
a winning strategy.
These comments, however, are aimed more at the broader literature than
at this particular paper. Let me now put these larger concerns aside and
turn to some issues that are more speciﬁc to this paper.
The empirical heart of this paper concerns the persistence of output. In
Svensson’s model, the desirability of inﬂation or price-level targeting de-
pends on the autoregressive parameter in the output equation. The more
persistent output shocks are, the more attractive price-level targeting be-
comes. An autoregressive parameter of 0.5 is a crucial cutoﬀ.
This raises a natural question: how long is a period in the model? That
is, what frequency of data should we use to implement the model? If out-
put is AR(1) with parameter 0.8 in quarterly data, it is AR(1) with param-
eter 0.41 ( 0.84) in annual data. We would reach a diﬀerent conclusion
about policy if we applied the model at an annual rather than a quarterly
frequency. The Cecchetti-Kim paper uses quarterly data, but it does not ex-
plain why this is the right choice.
There is, however, something in the model that can be used to pin down
the choice of data frequency: the timing of expectations. The Phillips curve
in this model is based on one-period-ahead expectations of the price level.
The paper does not tell us precisely how this equation is motivated, but one
common approach is Fischerian labor contracts predetermining the nom-
inal wage. In this case, the relevant issue is how far in advance wages are
set. If wages are set one year ahead, rather than one quarter, applying the
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timated autoregressive parameters would be much lower than those pre-
sented in the paper. By using higher-frequency data, the authors build in a
bias toward their conclusion of price-level targeting.
Another nuts-and-bolts empirical issue that is crucial for this paper is
the classic topic of detrending. Cecchetti and Kim look at persistence in
quarterly output detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. But an
arbitrary parameter in this ﬁlter governs how much of the low-frequency
movement in the data is ﬁltered out. Their results in table 4.1 tell us that
shocks to U.S. GDP have a half-life of about three quarters. I suspect that
this result is more an artifact of the ﬁlter than a fact about the data. If they
altered the smoothing parameter in the HP ﬁlter, they would be likely to get
very diﬀerent estimates for this key autoregressive parameter.
A central issue in this model is the length of time with which monetary
shocks inﬂuence output. If we knew the answer to this question, we could
use it to calibrate the autoregressive parameter and judge whether the pa-
rameter is bigger or smaller than 1/2, the key cutoﬀ. If I am right that we
should be thinking at an annual frequency, because labor contracts are an-
nual more often than quarterly, then the key question is this: does a mone-
tary shock’s eﬀect on output dissipate by more or less than 50 percent if
measured a year after the shock? I don’t know the answer, but I doubt we
can learn it from running univariate autoregressions using HP ﬁltered
output.
In closing, let me brieﬂy address the big question of whether price-level
targeting really would be a good monetary policy. There are now a lot of
academic studies suggesting that it would be a good policy for a variety of
reasons. My experience from talking to central bankers, however, is that
they are often horriﬁed at the idea. They have trouble imagining that a pe-
riod of higher-than-target inﬂation should be followed by a period of
lower-than-target inﬂation.
The reason they are horriﬁed by this prospect, I think, is that in their
hearts they don’t really believe the Lucas critique. They tend to view the
world through the lens of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve with
adaptive expectations. If that model were truly structural, then price-level
targeting would not be very attractive. Academics, however, are more likely
to view that reduced form as an artifact of the monetary regime we have
had over the past several decades. The reduced-form Phillips curve would
look very diﬀerent if a central bank adopted price-level targeting.
We academics, however, should be careful to maintain a bit of humility
when we engage in this policy debate. We have to admit that our under-
standing of inﬂation-output dynamics is still primitive. Until we reach a
consensus about the right model about the Phillips curve, we cannot be
conﬁdent about the eﬀect of any alternative monetary policy, especially
proposals as radical as price-level targeting.
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Discussion Summary
In response to Gregory Mankiw’s comments, Lars Svensson defended the
relevance and importance of delegating an objective other than social wel-
fare to the central bank. Social welfare is obviously too complex and mul-
tidimensional an objective to be operational for monetary policy, and as-
signing it to monetary policy is counterproductive, as monetary history has
clearly shown. A large part of successful monetary policy reforms in many
countries has instead consisted of assigning, by legislation or government
instructions, simple and veriﬁable objectives for central banks, such as
price stability or ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, with (for instance) the under-
standing that the explicit or implicit output target is the natural output
level rather than the socially optimal output level. This has resulted in bet-
ter outcomes from a social welfare point of view. Other economic policy
than monetary policy is then assigned to raise the natural output level to-
ward the optimal level.
George Evans suggested that the New Keynesian Phillips curve was at-
tractive because it is forward-looking, an assumption that policymakers
would ﬁnd plausible.
Bennett McCallum argued that the assumption that central bankers act
in a discretionary manner was at odds with the assumption that they would
be willing to minimize a delegated loss function that was diﬀerent from
their own. Concerning price-level targeting, in his earlier work on target-
ing the level of nominal GDP versus targeting nominal GDP growth, he
had found beneﬁcial eﬀects of using growth but giving some small weight
also to the level and hence inducing trend stationarity of nominal GDP.
Michael Woodford agreed with Gregory Mankiw that the assignment
of an objective to the central bank was a problematic way of avoiding the
losses caused by discretionary optimization. He argued, however, that
price-level targeting was valuable independent of whether it was imple-
mented by delegation of a loss function or in some other way—for ex-
ample, because it was easily interpretable and robust across diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations.
Mervyn King expressed the view that price-level targeting would be too
costly if the Phillips curve was backward looking, and that therefore the
private sector’s expectations formation was a key issue to judge whether
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ing may give the impression that the central bank was too much engaged in
ﬁne-tuning the economy, unless the horizon chosen over which to return
the price level to its target was suﬃciently long.
John Berry expressed the concern that the choice of the target path for
the price level had to take into consideration measurement error in the
price index in terms of which the target was formulated.
Stephen Cecchetti replied that he agreed that the delegation of an objec-
tive function was an idea that in practice would be diﬃcult to implement.
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